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Abstract 
As credit is one of the most important factors required for smallholders input utilization, its repayment to the lender 
is also of paramount importance to have sustainable agricultural development and financial institutions. Therefore, 
the major concern of this study was to identify the major socio-economic, institutional and natural factors that 
affect loan repayment capacity of smallholder farmers in Lemo district of Hadiya zone, Southern Ethiopia. The 
main data used for this study were collected from a sample of formal credit borrower farmers in the zone through 
structured questionnaire. A total of 118 farm households cases were included in the final analysis. In addition, 
secondary data were collected from different organizations and pertinent publication in order to elaborate the 
present situation of rural credit in Ethiopia. Two-limit Tobit model was employed to analyze factors influencing 
loan repayment and intensity of loan recovery among smallholder farmers in the zone.  A total of fifteen 
explanatory variables were included in the model of which five variables were found to be significant. These were 
size of land holding, total number of livestock, number of years of experience in agricultural extension services, 
number of extension contact days, and income from off-farm activities. Therefore, consideration of these factors 
is vital as it provides information that would enable to undertake effective measures with the aim of improving 
loan repayment in the district. It would also enable lenders and policy makers to have information as to where and 
how to channel efforts in order to maximize loan repayment capacity.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The economic growth of developing countries depends to a great extent on the growth of the agricultural sector. 
Ethiopia is a country typified by a predominantly subsistence agrarian economy. The nature of farming in Ethiopia 
is characterized by traditional micro holdings and subsistence type with less than two hectares of land on the 
average (CSA, 1990). The principal components of the output of the sector are food crops, livestock and livestock 
products. Small farmers work on 95% of the total cultivated area and produce over 90% of the national crop 
production, whereas private investors and state farms work on the rest (Solomon, 1993; Getachew, 1995).  
Ethiopia has reasonably good resource potential for agricultural development- biodiversity, water resources, 
minerals, etc.  Yet, it is faced with complex poverty, which is broad, deep, and structural.  The proportion of the 
population below the poverty line is 44 per cent in 1999/2000   (MoFED, 2002).  In spite of the huge agricultural 
potential, the growth in agricultural production has not been able to keep pace with that of the demand. Great 
proportion of cultivated land is held by subsistence farmers who produce about 97% of the national agricultural 
output  (Welday, 1999). The small-scale farmers, however, produce a little ‘surplus’ over their requirement and, 
hence, could not adequately feed the population out of the agricultural sector.   
The contributing factors to the low level of productivity are many but poor and backward technology is the 
principal one. Production methods have remained unchanged for thousands of years. Times and methods of sowing 
crops are the same as those mentioned in the books explaining the history of Ethiopia; the implements and tools 
for tilling, harvesting, threshing, and winnowing are identical with, if improved a little better than, those described 
in the ancient books. In brief, Ethiopia’s agriculture is characterized by extremely limited capital resources, the 
use of traditional methods of production and, thus, low productivity of resources.  
According to Timmer (1988), the first step for economic development is 'getting agriculture moving'. Moshar 
(1966) has classified the facilities and services involved in the modernization of agriculture into two groups viz. 
the essentials and the accelerators. The former, as the name implies, must be present to enable a farmer to adopt 
an innovation; and the latter are those that may be important to get an innovation adopted. Credit is one of the five 
accelerators that Mosher (1966) listed. 
With introduction of new production technologies, the financial needs of farmers have increased manifold in 
Ethiopia. Steady agricultural development depends upon the continuous increase in farm investment. Most of the 
time, especially during the take-off stage of agricultural development, heavy investment cannot be made by the 
farmers out of their own funds because of their present level of incomes. Moreover, there exists no significant 
margin of income that can be channeled into the agricultural sector to undertake development activities. Thus, here 
comes the importance and significance of the availability of rural credit to bridge the gap between owned and 
required capital (Singh et al., 1985). 
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Delivering productive credit to the rural poor has been a hotly pursued but problem-plagued undertaking. 
Providing low-cost, efficient credit services and recovering a high percentage of loans granted are the idea and 
aims in rural finance (Wenner, 1995). Over the last four decades international donor agencies and governments of 
less developing countries have spent billions of dollars on projects, rapidly expanding the volume of agricultural 
loan and the number of rural institutions (Adams and Graham, 1981). But, the increasing default rate has been one 
of the major problems for all financial institutions. Increasing defaults in the repayment of loans may lead to very 
serious implications. For instance, it discourages the financial institutions to refinance the defaulting members, 
which put the defaulters once again into vicious circle of low productivity. Therefore, a thorough investigation of 
the various aspects of loan defaults, source of credit, purpose of the loan, form of the loan, and condition of loan 
provision are of utmost importance both for policy makers and the lending institutions. In Ethiopia, the current 
agricultural loan repayment performance is not promising. Therefore, a thorough investigation of the various 
aspects of loan defaults, source of credit and condition of loan provision are of great importance both for policy 
makers and lending institutions. Hence, this study was undertaken to analyze the determinants of loan repayment 
from formal sources in Lemo district of Hadiya zone, Southern Ethiopia. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Credit is the key means to have access to inputs in many development programs. This is particularly true for rural 
development because so long as sufficient credit is not provided to the development programs of weaker sections 
of the society, the goal of development may not be achieved. As a result of high population pressure in rural areas 
of developing countries, like Ethiopia, increasing of additional productive land is difficult implying the need of 
improving farm level productivity through intensification. This involves as pointed out by Jama and Kulundu  
(1992), use of improved farm inputs such as fertilizers and improved seeds besides improved tillage and husbandry 
practices. These inputs are not available on the farm and some farmers are not able to purchase them due to lack 
of finance. Moreover, most of the commercial inputs are expensive and hence smallholder farmers cannot afford 
to buy them from their own cash earnings. It is, therefore, generally acknowledged that agricultural credit to 
smallholder farmers can help to improve their farm productivity through use of improved farm inputs. 
A number of researchers (Adams &Graham, 1981; Gongalez-Vega, 1977; FAO, 1996) reported the 
requirement of credit facilities to small holders of less developed countries (LDCs) for production and 
consumption smoothing. Governments of LDCs and aid agencies have spent a large amount of money to this sector. 
The motivation has been the belief that loans are an essential part of various input packages that were prescribed 
as part of agricultural investment projects designed to introduce modern technologies and thus stimulate change 
and growth in agriculture. 
According to Kebede (1995), credit makes traditional agriculture more productive through the purchase of 
farm equipment and other agricultural inputs, the introduction of modern irrigation system and other technological 
developments. Credit can also be used as an instrument for market stability. Rural farmers can build their 
bargaining power by establishing storage facilities and providing transport system acquired through credit. Credit 
plays a key role in covering consumption deficits of farm households. This would, in turn, enable the farm family 
to work efficiently in agricultural activities. Credit can farther be used as an income transfer mechanism to remove 
the inequalities in income distribution among the small, middle, and big farmers. Moreover, credit encourages 
savings and savings held with rural financial institutions that could be channeled to farmers for use in agricultural 
production. Credit also creates employment opportunities for rural farmers. 
Rural households in Ethiopia need credit for investment in a range of on-farm, off-farm and off_farm activities. 
There is potentially a huge demand for credit from 10-12 million rural families, which is hardly met at present  
(IFAD, 2001). Most productive activities are seasonal and there is equally strong credit demand for consumption 
smoothing.  
A major economic problem in developing countries is financial intermediation, the mobilization of capital 
from one group (savers/lenders) and its simultaneous allocation to meet the needs of another group 
(borrowers/entrepreneurs) (Christensen, 1993). Critical for efficient capital mobilization and allocation, financial 
intermediation can be performed through various forms of instrument. The three most important ones are equities 
(stocks), long-term (bonds), and short-term loans (credit) (Stiglitz, 1989). In most developing countries, because 
of the relative under-development of first two forms of instruments, credit markets for short term loans become 
the major means of financial intermediation. The capital mobilization function of credit markets is, however, 
constrained by several factors.  First when there is a lack of macroeconomic stability, as experienced by many 
Latin American countries during the 1970s and 1980s, people prefer to invest in fixed assets- real estate, jewelry, 
etc… or to save in foreign currencies overseas, instead of depositing local currencies in domestic institutions. 
Second, savers are willing to deposit money in saving institutions only if they believe that they will be able 
to withdraw the money according to pre specified terms. The risk of bank closure and the availability of deposit 
insurance become important considerations for potential depositors. In many countries, governments establish 
banking regulations such as capital and reserve requirement to ensure the ability of banks to meet withdrawal 
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demand. 
Third, government regulations create opportunities for political abuses. In some developing countries, for 
example: banking system is tightly controlled by government officials who see it as a convenient source of cheap 
credit for their own expenditure projects and their favored political clients ( Hanke and Walters, 1991). Offering 
mostly negative real interest rates to depositors, the banking system is not an attractive saving avenue for most 
people (McKinnon, 1973). The limitation of the formal banking system may be compensated by informal credit 
arrangements that offer higher returns for depositors, but these informal arrangements are usually limited in scale 
and lack legal protection for depositors.  
Knowledge of determinants of loan repayment is undoubtedly important for it provides information to be the 
lender on the incentives available for the borrower to comply with repayment schedules. Loan repayment 
performance is affected by a number of socioeconomic, institutional and natural factors. Some of which are 
believed to impact on repayment negatively while others have positive impact. Various studies have been carried 
out concerning loan repayment performance of borrowers in several countries. The following presents the findings 
of studies on loan repayment performance. 
Major socioeconomic variables that affect credit repayment include education, age of household head, family 
size, gender of household head, etc…. Family size is expected to affect loan repayment performance positively. 
This is because farmers with more families may have more labor force for more diversified sources of income. For 
instance, Schreiner and Nagarajan (1997), in a case study in Gambia,reported that large households are better in 
credit risks. Where as Bhenda (1983) in his Indian case study, revealed that households with large family were 
more prone to defaults. Also, Kashuliza(1993) reported a negative but statistically insignificant relationship 
between household size and repayment performance. 
Educational level of household head is another socioeconomic variable that affects loan default rate both 
positively and negatively. For instance, Mengistu (1997) conducted a study on the Market Town Development 
Program (MTDP) Credit Scheme of Bahir Dar and Awassa towns using a binomial probit model. The study 
indicated that education has positive impact on loan repayment. In addition, Ike (1986), in his economic and 
financial analysis on the problem of loan default in Nigeria recommended that to improve loan recovery, 
educational level of borrowers should be improved. On the other hand, Matin (1997), in his study on loan 
repayment performance of borrowers in Bangladesh obtained a significant and negative relationship between 
education status of the household and loan default rate. Bekele et al (2003), in his Ethiopian case study revealed 
that, even if the variable was statistically insignificant there was a negative relation ship between educational status 
of household head and household’s loan repayment performance. According to him the reason was that literate 
farmers were on average younger than the illiterate ones and that older farmers have the tendency to accumulate 
more wealth and were better able to pay the loans they borrowed. Similar findings were also reported by other 
researchers. For instance, Njaku and Obasi (1991), in their Nigerian case study and Yaqub (1995), in his 
Bangladesh case study indicated that education was negatively related with loan repayment. 
As far as gender of household head is concerned, an empirical study made in Guyana by Hunte (1996) using 
logistic regression model showed that male borrowers generate low default risks, minimum or low credit rationing 
(giving nearly the amount the borrower requested or demanded) and high repayment performance. Where as, the 
finding of Yaqub (1995) showed that women were better than their male counter parts in loan repayment 
performance.Another socioeconomic variable that affects loan repayment is farm size. Belay (2002), used 
maximum likelihood estimates of the logistic regression model and showed that farm size was important factor 
influencing the loan repayment performance of rural women in Eastern Ethiopia. That is, the total farm size, which 
is a proxy for a host of factors including wealth and income, has a significant and positive impact on loan 
repayment performance. Similarly, Sharma and Zeller (1997) in their Bangladesh case study revealed that land 
holding had negative and significant effect on the delinquency. Like wise, Matin (1997) by his study of repayment 
performance in Grameen Bank, reported that the total operated land holding of the households was negatively 
associated with default after a certain level.  
Livestock ownership is another socioeconomic variable that affects repayment performance. Belay and Belay 
(1998) in a case study at Alemegena District (Ethiopia) found out a significant positive relation ship of livestock 
ownership and loan repayment performance of farmers. Accordingly, animal production was found to be important 
source of cash income during sharp fall of crop prices. Also, Bekele (2001) in his Ethiopian case study using logit 
model revealed that value of total livestock holding has positive impact on loan repayment performance of 
smallholder farmers. According to the study, farmers who owned more livestock were able to repay their loans 
even when their crops failed due to natural disaster.   
With regard to the relationship between off-farm activities income and loan repayment performance, Sharma 
and Zeller (1997) reported that off- farm income negatively influenced loan repayment performance of group-
based borrowers of Bangladesh. According to the authors, off-farm income might increase willful default, as 
income was generated from various sources, the borrowers might become reluctant and might not give more 
emphasis to loan repayment. Similarly Bekele(2001), in his Ethiopian case study, revealed that off-farm income 
Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development                                                                                                                        www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1700 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2855 (Online) 
Vol.8, No.23, 2017 
 
27 
influenced the loan recovery of farmers negatively. According to him, larger proportion of defaulter households 
participated in off-farm activities than the non-defaulters. Households who exercise off-farm activities probably 
gave less attention to farm affairs as income was generated from different angles. In other words, households who 
generate income form off-farm sources tend to be will full defaulters, because the punishment, which could be 
inhibition of access to credit in the following season, may be less painful to them as they are less dependent on 
farm activities. The other possible explanation is that households who take part on off-farm activities may divert 
input loans to supplement the off-farm business.     
Institutional variables were another factors, which could affect loan repayment performance of smallholder 
farmers. Possible institutional factor that affect loan repayment include extension contact, source of credit, loan 
amount etc… As far as source of credit is concerned, Miller (1997) indicated that the principal reasons for some 
loans not to be repaid are: borrowers anticipate a change in credit policies or because they lack confidence in the 
ability of credit institutions’ to provide credit in the following year.  Wenner (1995) stated that, formal lenders find 
difficult and costly to ascertain accurately the likelihood of defaults; and monitor closely how borrowers use funds 
and what technologies they choose for project implementation. Thus, borrowers may not take actions that make 
repayment more likely (moral hazard). Weak legal system, lack of secured collateral, and pervasive views that 
government bank loans are patronage magnify loan enforcement costs for formal loans. In contrast, informal lender 
faces substantially lower screening and monitoring costs because of social proximity and multi-stranded 
relationships with clients. Thus, credit obtained from informal sources has high likelihood of being repaid than 
credit obtained from formal sources. For instance, Bhende (1983) reported that defaults were endemic in 
institutional credit; they were infrequent in informal credit. Absolutely speaking, the largest defaulters were those 
households who have borrowed most from institutional sources.    
Loan amount is also another prominent factor that affects loan repayment performance. Vigno (1993) in a 
case study of Burkina Faso stated that large loan amount receivers were better payers than less amount of loan 
receivers. This result is in complete agreement with that of Bekele et al. (2003) who in a case study of Ethiopia 
using logit model, stating that farmers who took larger loans had better loan repayment performance. According 
to them, this could be attributable to the effectiveness of local leaders in screening loan applications. The results 
of Belay and Belay (1998) also strengthen the finding of negative relation ship between loan default and loan 
amount. Similarly, Sharma and Zeller (1997) used Tobit model and found that, in Bangladesh the grater the loan 
size, the greater the probability of unwilling default. This was because in the event of project failure, the borrower 
or group of borrowers will find it more difficult to meet repayment obligations out of their personal funds. Berhanu 
(1999) also reported that loan size contributed to reduction of the probability of full loan repayment in Ethiopia.  
Different researchers emphasized the influence of the frequency of farmer’s contact with development agents on 
loan repayment performance. Logically, the higher the linkage between farmers and development agents, the more 
the information flow and the technological (knowledge) transfer from the later to the former. Therefore, the farmers 
who have frequent contacts with development agents are likely to settle their debt timely as opposed to those who 
have no or less contacts. Jama and Kulundu (1992) analyzed small farmers’ credit repayment performance in 
Kenya and found that, inadequate supervision and advice to farmers were positively related to the proportion of 
loan diverted. The proportion of loan funds diverted to non-intended purposes was also positively related to the 
proportion of arrears on loan given to the farmers and was significant at 5 percent level. Similarly, Belay and Belay, 
998) also reported that, those farmers who made frequent contact with development agents were those who paid 
their loans back to the lenders in time where as those who had less or no contact were defaulters. In this study an 
attempted was to place more emphasis than earlier studies on continuity characteristics of dependent variable and 
method of data analysis.  
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Description of the Study Area 
Lemo is one of the 10 rural Districts of Hadiya Administrative Zone in Southern Ethiopia. It is bordered on the 
south by the Kembata Tembaro Zone, on the southwest by Duna and Soro Districts, on the west by Gomibora 
District, on the northwest by Misha District, on the north by Gurage Zone, on the northeast by Ana Lemo District, 
and on the southeast by Shashogo District. It is located some 230 km south of Addis Ababa and 175 km west of 
Hawassa town. There are a total of 33 kebeles in the District. Rural towns in the District are Belesa and Lisana. It 
has a total land of 34,973 hectare. The town of Hosanna is surrounded by Lemo District. Based on the 2007 Census 
conducted by the CSA, the District has a total population of 118,594, of  whom 58,666 were men and 59,928 were 
women; 2,049 or 1.73 percent of its population were urban dwellers. However, based on 2012/13 annual household 
survey of the District, it has a total population of 150,719, of whom 74,574 were men and 76,145 were women. 
The majority of the inhabitants were Protestants, with 74.07 percent of the population, 12.37 percent were Muslim, 
7.2 percent were Ethiopian Orthodox Christian, and 6.14 percent were Catholic.  
The Loan Services/Products that provided by financial institutions are: agricultural loan, petty trade loan, 
handicraft loan and service loan. Annual lending rate is 15 percent for all loan types and no other additional charges. 
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the institutions have adopted some policy regarding loan term. These include: loan term for all agricultural and 
micro-business loans ranges between three months and two years depending on the type of activities financed; 
loan term for small investment and working capital loan on the other hand extends from a minimum of two years 
to the maximum of 5 years depending on the nature of the business being financed; working capital loans are 
provided only for a maximum of one year; it is only for investment loans that the policy of 2 to 5 years repayment 
terms applies; a grace period is only ten days for all installment loans;  and for trade activities where returns are 
expected fairly rapidly, monthly repayment is required, while agricultural loans may have longer periods. 
 
3.2. Sampling procedures and Data Sources 
3.2.1. Sampling procedure 
To select sampled respondent farmers, two-stage simple random sampling technique was employed. Use of 
administrative units is necessary to select representative study sites within the District. The smallest administrative 
unit in the District is Kebele. There were 33 Kebeles in the District. All kebeles in the District were the beneficiaries 
of financial institutions services, particularly credit service. Since 95 percent (about 31 Kebeles) of the District are 
midland and 5 percent (only 2 Kebeles) of the District are highland which is insignificant (meaning very small in 
number), the sampled Kebeles were selected out of those midland Kebeles by assuming the midland Kebeles would 
represent the District. Three Kebeles namely: Ambicho Gode, Jawe and Shurmo were randomly selected. The 
reasons for choosing the simple random sampling technique are its simplicity and existence of similarity in farmers’ 
socio-economic conditions in all midland Kebeles of the District. Thus, those chosen kebeles were assumed to be 
representative of Lemo district.  By taking the list of farm household heads from each selected Kebeles as a sample 
frame, 118 representative farm household heads were randomly selected in probability proportion to size of each 
Kebele’s population (Table 1). Representative sample size was determined using the formula which is developed 
by Yamane (1967): 
( )21 eN
N
n
+
=  
Where, n is sample size, N is target population and  e is level of precision, in this case it is 9%. 
Table 1. Total number of the sampled farmers and population in the sampled kebeles 
Kebele Total number of households Sampled farmers 
Ambicho Gode 889 39 
Jawe 904 39 
Shurmo 922 40 
Total 2715 118 
Source: Own computation, 2014 from LDOARD 
3.2.2. Data Sources and Methods of Data Collection  
In this study, both primary and secondary data sources were used to gather necessary data regarding determinants 
of formal source of credit loan repayment performance of smallholder farmers. The data used for this study were 
collected from a sample of formal credit borrower farmers through structured questionnaires, which were prepared 
for the study. Information pertaining to respondents, socio-economic characteristics and institutional situations etc. 
were obtained directly through the interview, which was conducted at household level. Secondary data were 
obtained from published and unpublished documents of different organizations 
Methods of Data Analysis: Descriptive statistics like means, frequencies, percentages, maximum, minimum, and 
range were used to describe the descriptive result while a two-limit Tobit model was employed to analyse 
determinants of formal source of credit loan repayment performance of smallholder farmers. 
Specification of the model: The two-limit Tobit was originally presented by Rossett and Nelson (1975) and 
discussed in detail by Maddala (1992) and Long (1997). The model derives from an underlying classical normal 
linear regression and can be represented as:  
y*  =  β′xi + εi ,                                       
 ε ~ N [0,σ2]. 
Denoting Yi as the observed dependent (censored) variable  
 L                         if Y* ≤ L 
Yi =  Y*= Xβ + εi       if L < Y* <U                                        
 U                        if Y* ≥ U 
 
Where, Yi = the observed dependent variable, in our case repayment ratio (ratio of amount repaid to the 
amount borrowed), Yi* = the latent variable (unobserved for values smaller than 0 and greater than 1), Xi  = is a 
vector of independent variables (factors affecting loan repayment and intensity of loan recovery), 
iβ   =  Vector 
of unknown parameters , εi =  Residuals that are independently and normally distributed with mean zero and a 
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common variance 
2σ , and  i= 1,2,…n ( n is the number of observations). 
By using the two-limit Tobit model, the ratio of repayment was regressed on the various factors hypothesized 
to influence loan repayment performance of smallholder farmers in the study area. 
The log likelihood function for the general two-limit Tobit model can be given as follow: 
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Where C’s are point observations, L’s are left censored observations, R’s are right-censored observations, 
and I’s are intervals. And Φ is the standard cumulative normal distribution, and the wj is the normalized weight of 
the jth observation. The Tobit coefficients do not directly give the marginal effects of the associated independent 
variables on the dependent variable. But their signs show the direction of change in probability of being non-
defaulter and marginal intensity of loan recovery as the respective explanatory variable change (Amemiya, 1984; 
Goodwin, 1992; Maddala, 1985). The Tobit model has an advantage in that its coefficients can be farther 
disaggregated to determine the effect of a change in the ith variable on changes in the probability of being non-
defaulter (Mc Donaled and Moffit, 1980) as follows:  
1. The change in the probability of repaying the loan as an independent variable Xi changes is:  
                  
σ
β
δφ
δ i
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=
∂
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2. The change in intensity of loan recovery with respect to a change in an explanatory variable among non-complete 
defaulters is: 
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3. The marginal effect of an explanatory variable on the expected value of the dependent  
      Variable is:   
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  Where, Xi  = explanatory variables, Φ (δ) =  the cumulative normal distribution  δ =
σ
β ii X
= the Z-score for the 
area under normal curve, βi   = a vector of  Tobit maximum likelihood estimates, σ   =  the standard error of the 
error term.   
 
L and U are threshold values ( L =0 and U =1 ), φ and Φ are probability density and cumulative density functions 
of the  standard normal distribution, respectively. 
 
3.3 DEFINITIONS AND HYPOTHESIS OF VARIABLES. 
The dependent variable of the econometric model for this study is the proportion of formal loan repaid during the 
specified repayment period. This was calculated as the ratio of the total amount of credit repaid to the total amount 
of due. Its value ranges between 0 and 1. Those borrower farmers that did not repay any amount of money they 
borrowed are considered as complete defaulters (i.e., the value the repayment ratio in this case is zero). On the 
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other hand, those farmers that repaid back some proportion of the money they borrowed with in the stated time are 
considered as non-defaulters.  
Based on the literatures reviewed and discussion held with stakeholders, the explanatory variables selected 
for this study were broadly categorized under socioeconomic, institutional and natural factors. In what follows, a 
brief explanation of the explanatory variables selected for this study and their likely influence on the loan 
repayment performance is presented below. 
Family size (FAM_SIZE): Refers to the number of people under the same roof. The larger the family members, 
the more the labor force available for production purpose. Therefore, there is a possibility to have more alternative 
sources of income to overcome credit risks (Schereiner & Nagarajan, 1997). Based on this, families with sufficient 
labor-force would be expected to low probability of defaulting. On the other hand, large family size may imply 
self-insufficiency in terms of food consumption because large households consume more than do small households. 
This is usually true if the dependency ratio of the household is large. Therefore, the effect of family size, on formal 
loan repayment capacity may be indeterminate a priori.  
Gender of the household head (GENDER): This is dummy variable in the model, which takes a value 1 if the 
household head is male and 0, if the household head is female. Gender differentials in the farm households play a 
significant role in economic performance of a given household. Some empirical studies have demonstrated that 
gender is important in defining the economic role of rural people in Africa (McSweeney, 1979; Dey, 1980). More 
specifically, Gender differentials can be related to access to credit and one may expect that female-headed 
households are less experienced in formal credit and hence will be defaulters for they know little about the 
consequences of loan default. The opposite expectation may be that female borrowers tend to be more loyal to the 
lenders than male borrowers. This may arise from the fact that females are more responsible for childcare and 
home management and hence they may be concerned more than males about the possible undesirable consequences 
arising from the default. Therefore, it is expected that Gender of household head would have either positive or 
negative impact on loan repayment performance of the respondents. 
Age of the borrower (AGE) : These variables were measured in years. Through time household heads acquire 
experience in the farming business and/or credit use. Moreover, older borrowers may accumulate more wealth 
than younger ones. Therefore, this variable is hypothesized to have positive impact on loan repayment performance 
of respondents.  
Education level (EDUCTLVL): This is a dummy variable, which takes a value 1 if the household head is literate 
and 0 otherwise. Education increases farmers’ ability to get, process and use information. For example, literate 
farmers may seek information on prices more than the illiterates ones and consequently sell their produce at 
reasonable prices. Moreover, education may enable farmers to be more aware of the importance of formal loan 
and hence may reduce willful default. Therefore, ceteris paribus, education is expected to reduce the rate of loan 
default. 
Land holding (LNDHOLD): Refers to the total farm size (in hectares) owned by the family. A farmer with more 
hectares of land is expected to be better off in loan repayment performance. This is because, if augmented with 
other factors of production, large farm size will give higher production that will enable the borrower to repay 
his/her loan. Therefore, this variable is expected to have positive relation with the dependent variable.  
Number of livestock owned (LIVSTKNO): This variable defined in terms of Tropical Livestock Unit (TLU) and 
may serve as a proxy for the capacity to bear risks of using credit for the purchase of new technology such as 
fertilizer and capture wealth effect. Livestock may also serve as a proxy for oxen ownership, which is important 
for farm operations. It is expected that this variable would have positive influence on loan repayment performance. 
Income from off-farm activities (OFF_FARM): This is dummy variable, which takes a value 1 if any member 
of the household was involved in off-farm activities and 0, otherwise. Off-farm activities generate additional 
sources of income for smallholders. The cash generated from these activities would back up the farmers’ income 
to settle debt. Therefore, off-farm income, is hypothesized to have positive impact on loan repayment rate.  
Expenditure on social festivals (CRMEXPNS): These are expenditure (in Birr) on celebration such as weddings, 
funerals, engagements, circumcisions etc. over one year period. Occasionally, such expenses are more than the 
normal economic stand of the borrower. As this variable can be a proxy for use of income for non-productive 
purposes, it is expected to have a negative impact on loan repayment performance of the farmer 
Experience in Extension package (PKGEXPRC): is the number of years a farmer participated in extension 
program. Participating in Extension program play a great role in agitating farmers to repay institutional loans in 
time. Participation in extension programs is helpful as such farmers could have better income as a result of the use 
of new agricultural technologies. Therefore, the more number of years the farmers participated in Extension 
program, the better would be the loan repayment performance. 
Contact with development agents (DACONTCT): This is the number of days per three months time a farmer 
contacts a development agent for technical guidance. The higher the linkage between farmers and development 
agents, the more the information flow and the technological (knowledge) transfer from the later to the former. 
Thus, those farmers who have frequent contacts with development agents are likely to settle their debt timely as 
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opposed to those who have no or few contacts. 
Distance from main road (RODDIST): This is measured in kilometers from the respondent’s residence to the 
main road; and is used as a proxy for market access and different institutions. Borrowers near by the main road 
have a location advantage and can sell their farm produce at good price and can contact the lender and development 
agent easily and frequently than those who live in more distant locations. Therefore, nearness to main road is 
expected to increase the repayment performance of smallholders. 
Amount of loan (LNAMNT): are the value of a loan (in Birr). The greater the loan size, the greater the probability 
of unwilling default (negatively relate with loan repayment). This is because in the event of production failure, the 
borrower will find it more difficult to meet repayment obligations out of his/her personal funds.  
 Purpose of borrowing (BORWPURP): This is a dummy variable, which takes a value 1 if the household 
borrowed loan for purchase of farm inputs and 0, otherwise. The expenses on variable agricultural inputs purchase 
such as chemical fertilizers and improved seeds are used to produce enterprises that would give maximum benefits 
to the farmer. As this variable proxies the use of the loan for productive purposes, it is expected to have positive 
impact on loan repayment performance of small holders.  
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1. Results of Descriptive Statistics Analysis.  
The descriptive statistics analysis made use of tools such as mean, percentage, standard deviation and frequency 
distribution. In addition, T-test and Chi-square test statistics were employed to compare defaulter and non-defaulter 
groups with respect to some explanatory variables. 
Out of the total 118 interviewed households 85 (72%) were non-defaulters, and the remaining 33 (28%) were 
defaulters. Among the defaulters, 18 (55 %) were complete defaulters while 15(44) repaid 30-70 percent of the 
total loan of which they borrowed. The average age of household heads was 43 years with the minimum and 
maximum ages of 21 and 73 years, respectively. The average age of non-defaulter household heads was 45 years, 
while that of defaulters was 41 years with mean difference significant at 1% level. On the other hand, the average 
family size of the sample households was 5.87; higher than the national average of 5 persons (CSA, 1994). The 
largest family size was 14 and the smallest was 1. The average family size of non-defaulters was 5.84, while that 
of defaulters was 5.74 with no significant difference between means of the two groups.  
The survey results also revealed that 74 percent of the sample household heads were illiterate, whereas 26 
percent of the house holds heads were literate (Table 3). Of the total sample respondents, 74 percent of the non-
defaulters and 72 percent of defaulters were illiterate respectively. There was no significant difference between 
defaulters and non-defaulters in terms of their literacy level. The sample was composed of both male and female-
headed households. Of the total sample household heads 82 percent were male household heads and 18 percent 
were female household heads.  15 percent of the defaulters and 19 percent of the non-defaulters were female-
headed households respectively. The differences in terms of gender among the two groups was not significant 
(Table 3).  
The distance in km that the beneficiaries traveled to get main road for accessing different services was 
assessed. In line with this, the average distance traveled by the respondents to the main road was about 4.17 km. 
On average, non-defaulters traveled about 4.65 Km while the defaulters traveled on average about 6.42 km to 
reach the main road. The mean difference between the distances covered by non-defaulters and defaulters was 
statistically significant at 5 % level of probability (Table 2). Land is the basic asset of farmers. The average size 
of own cultivated land was nearly 1.49 ha, the minimum and the maximum being 0.25 and 5 ha, respectively.  
Non-defaulters cultivated on average larger area of land (1.51ha) than defaulters (1.07ha). The mean difference 
was significant at 1 % level.  
Table2. Socio-economic and institutional characteristics of the households (continues variables)                                                              
Characteristics 
Non-defaulters 
(N=85) 
Defaulters 
(N=33) 
T- value 
 
Total Sample 
(N=118) 
Mean St.dev Mean St.dev Mean St. dev 
Age  45 12 41 13.04 2.881 *** 43 11 
Family Size  5.84 2.27 5.74 2.05 0.241 5.87 2.15 
Total land holding  1.51 0.95 1.07 0.93 4.473*** 1.49 0.83 
Total live stocks in TLU 3.71 4.27 2.12 2.59 2.400** 3.77 4.03 
Amount of money spent for social ceremonies 40.55 244.70 86.76 177.23 0.594 64.81 234.91 
Amount of Money Borrowed  426.90 369.60 321.90 256.38 1.554 404.17 350.19 
DA contact days/ months 1.86 1.46 0.97 1.36 2.611** 1.52 1.46 
Experience in agri. ext 2.99 1.81 2.00 0.24 3.121*** 2.73 1.65 
Distance     4.65   3.71     6.42 4.841    2.215**     5.28 4.171 
Source. Computed from the field survey data 
*** and **  represent level of significant at 1% and 5% level respectively.  
Farmers in the study area undertake both crop and livestock production activities. Though livestock holding 
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size varied among the sample farmers, 84.75 percent of the total respondents owned livestock. Livestock are kept 
for various economic and social reasons in the study area. The major economic reasons include provision or supply 
of draught power, generation of cash income, food and animal dung (as an organic fertilizer and fuel).  Based on 
Storck et al. (1991) standard conversion factors, the livestock population number was converted into Tropical 
Livestock Unit (TLU), so as to facilitate comparison between the two groups.  On the average, a household had 
3.77 TLU with standard deviation of 4.03 (Table 3). The minimum number of livestock kept was 1 whereas the 
maximum was 35.5 TLU. Non-defaulters owned a larger number of livestock (on average 3.71 TLU) compared to 
the defaulters (on average 2.12 TLU) with mean difference significant at 5% significant level. The implication is 
that non-defaulters have more access to financial capital by selling their livestock to recover their loan (Table 2). 
Expenditure on social festivals includes expenditure for social ceremonies such as wedding, circumcision, funeral 
of a family member or close relative and engagement. Of the total respondents 10.50 percent reported that they 
had celebrated one or more of the above occasional ceremonies and 89.50 percent stated that they had not 
celebrated any of them during the study period.  Meanwhile, amount of money spent for social ceremonies were 
40.55 percent of non-defaulters and 86.76 percent of defaulters. The minimum and maximum expenditures for 
such ceremonies were Birr 100 and Birr 2535, respectively. Average amount of money spent for social ceremonies, 
was higher for the defaulters’ group than the non-defaulters’ group, although the difference was not found to be 
statistically significant (Table 2). Experience in agricultural extension package varied among the sample borrowers 
from minimum value of one-year experience to a maximum of 10 years experience. Non-defaulters participated 
on average for higher number of years (2.99) as compared to the defaulters who participated on average for 2 years 
(Table 2). The mean difference between the two groups was significant at 1% level of significance. That is, farmers 
experience in agricultural extension services has significant role in loan repayment performance. The results of 
the survey also indicate that 76.40 percent of the respondents had extension contact, while 23.60 percent did not 
have any contact with extension agents. An average number of extension contact days were 1.86 for non-defaulters 
and 0.97 for defaulters, respectively. The differences between the two groups, was significant at 5% probability 
level. That is, respondents who had frequent contacts with development agents settled their debt timely as 
compared to those who had no or few contacts (Table 2).   The sample households on average borrowed Birr 
404.17. However, the loan size varied in accordance with the type of financial institution. The survey result also 
revealed that on average Birr 426.90 was borrowed by non-defaulters and defaulters borrowed Birr 321.90 with 
no significant mean difference among the groups (Table 2). Another sources of income for the farmers of the area, 
other than livestock and crops production, were off-farm activities. About 28.00 percent of the sample household 
heads reported that at least one of their family members was engaged in off-farm activities, which helped them to 
earn additional income. The survey results also indicated that larger proportion of non-defaulter households (32 %) 
sent their members to off-farm activities as compared to the defaulter households (14 %), with significant 
percentage difference at 10 % probability level.  
Table 3. Socio-economic and institutional characteristics of farmrs (discrete  variables) 
 
 
Non-defaulters Defaulters 
χ2-value 
Total 
No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent 
Illiterate 
Literate 
63 
22 
74 
26 
24 
9 
72 
28 
5.157*** 87 
31 
74 
26 
Male 
Female 
69 
16 
81 
19 
28 
5 
85 
15 
2.172 97 
21 
82 
18 
Benefited Yes 
                No 
75 
10 
88 
12 
22 
11 
67 
33 
7.481*** 96 
22 
82 
18 
Income off-farm Yes 
                           No 
27 
58 
32 
68 
5 
28 
14 
86 
   3.756* 34 
84 
28 
72 
Saving Money Yes 
                          No 
8 
77 
7 
93 
0 
33 
0.00 
100.00 
2.814 
 
9 
109 
5 
95 
Purpose of borrowing 
 
For agri. Input purchasing 
For other purposes 
 
 
49 
36 
 
 
58 
42 
 
 
18 
15 
 
 
56 
44 
0.165  
 
67 
51 
 
 
57 
43 
Source. Computed from the field survey data 
*** and * Represents significant at 1%  and 10 %level  
The sample farmers were asked about their perception of the benefit of credit. Out of the total respondents, 
88 percent of the non-defaulters and 67 percent of defaulters replied that they have benefited from the credit service 
(Table 3). The difference in perception of credit benefits was significant between the two categories.  
 
4.2. Results of the Econometric Model 
This section presents and briefly discuss Two-limit Tobit regression results on the relationship of major socio-
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economic, institutional and natural factors that affect loan repayment capacity of smallholder farmers is presented. 
Two-limit Tobit was used to identify factors affecting loan repayment capacity of smallholder farmers. A VIF for 
continuous variables and contingency coefficient values for discrete variables were computed to check the 
existence of multicollinearity problem. The results revealed that no significant problems of multicollinearity and 
high degree of association among discrete variables were detected; then all the variables were included in the 
model. Besides, Breusch-Pagan test for checking the existence of heteroscedasticity problem was carried out; and 
the result (Prob > chi2 = 0.31) revealed that the problem of heteroscedasticity was not significant. The regression 
model was also checked if important variables are omitted from the model. The result of ‘ovtest’ (Prob>F = 0.47) 
showed that the model has no omitted variables.  
The estimated results of the Tobit model and the marginal effects are shown in tables 4 and 5 respectively. A 
total of fifteen explanatory variables were considered in the econometric model out of which five variables were 
found to significantly influence the probability of being non-defaulter and intensity of loan recovery among the 
farm households. On the other hand the size of land holding in hectare (LNDHOLD) is one of economic factors, 
which positively affected loan recovery of smallholder farmers (significant at 1% level). Each additional hectare 
of land holding increases the probability of being non-defaulter by 52.82 percent (Table 4). On average, each 
additional hectare of land holding of smallholder farmers increases the rate of loan repayment by 0.0619 for the 
entire sample and by 0.0765 for non-complete defaulters (borrowers who paid a certain amount of loan but not 
all), citrus paribus. As more and more land is brought under cultivation, farm-income is expected to increase due 
to the increased output. Therefore, having larger size of land enhances a borrower’s capacity to repay his/her loan 
timely. Total livestock ownership (LIVSTKNO) is, as expected, positively related to the dependent variable 
(significant at 10% level). Each additional TLU increases the probability being non-defaulter by 10.70 percent. 
Also, for each additional unit of TLU the rate of loan repayment increases by 0.0125 among the whole borrowers 
and by 0.0155 among non-complete defaulters. The implication is that, Livestock are sources of cash in rural 
Ethiopia and serve as security against crop failure. Farmers who owned more livestock are able to repay their loans 
even when their crops fail due to natural disaster. In addition, as a proxy to oxen ownership the result suggests that 
farmers who have larger number of livestock have sufficient number of oxen to plough their field timely and as a 
result obtain high yield and income to repay loans. 
Variables representing institutional service have strongly influenced smallholder farmer’s loan recovery. For 
instance, number of years of experience in agricultural extension services (PKGEXPRC) is the factor, which was 
positively related to the dependent variable (significant at 1% level). Each additional year of agriculture extension 
package experience increases the probability of being non-defaulter by 31.72 %. On average, one year additional 
participation experience in the extension package increases rate of loan repayment by 0.0372 among the whole 
respondents and by 0.0460 among non-complete defaulters, citrus paribus. This implies that experienced farmers 
in extension programs have developed their credit utilization and management skills that helped them to pay loans 
timely. In addition, as a result of their participation in extension for a number of years, these farmers are the 
beneficiers of the use of improved agricultural technologies that would increase their income generating capacity 
and these repay loans timely. Contact with DAs (DACONTCT) is another important institutional factor, which 
was positively related to the dependent variable (significant at 10 % level). Each additional contact increases a 
probability of being non-defaulter by 14.98 percent. Each additional DAs contact days increases the rate of 
repayment (repayment ratio) by 0.0171 for the entire sample and by 0.0216 for non-complete defaulters (Table 5). 
This implies that farmers with more accesses to technical assistance on agricultural activities were able to repay 
their loan as promised than those who had less or no assistance at all. The reason for this is that farmers who have 
frequent contact with development agents are better informed about markets and production technologies. As a 
result, they are motivated to timely repay their loans compared to those with less or no contact with DAs.  Getting 
income from off-farm activities (OFF-FARM) is another economic factor that was positively and significantly 
affected loan repayment performance of smallholder farmers. This might be due to the fact that; off-farm activities 
were additional sources of income for smallholders and the cash generated from these activities could back up the 
farmers’ income to settle their debt even during bad harvesting seasons and when repayment period coincides with 
low agricultural prices. Each additional unit of Off-farm income increases probability of being non-defaulter by 
90.59 percent and on average increases the rate of loan repayment by 0.1061 for the entire respondents and by 
0.131 among non-complete defaulters(Table 5). However, this result is contrary to Bekele’s (2001), findings that, 
off-farm income was negatively related with loan repayment performance of farmers.  
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Table 4. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Two-limit Tobit Model and the Effects of Explanatory Variables 
on Probability of being Non-defaulter. 
Variable  St. Error T-ratio Effect of change  
AGE  7.52 1.26 0.591 0.0459 
GENDER  -7.69 5.97 -1.287 0.4705 
FAM_SIZE -1.63 1.31 -1.249 -0.1000 
EDUCTLVL 2.14 4.83 0.044 0.0131 
RODDIST -1.51 5.31 -0.283 -0.0092 
LANDHOLD 8.65 2.58 3.371*** 0.5282 
LIVSTKNO 1.75 9.64 1.818* 0.1070 
PKGEXPRC 5.20 1.53 3.454*** 0.3172 
DACONTCT 2.44 1.45 1.742* 0.1498 
BROWPURP 7.18 4.85 1.493 0.4388 
LNAMNT -8.88 1.52 -0.581 -0.0005 
OFF_FARM     5.11 1.48 3.451*** 0.905 
CRMEXPNS 3.50 9.41 0.371 90.8021 
Saving  1.41 5.32 0.281 0.0091 
Purpose 5.10 5.53 0,921 0.3184 
Constant 7.48 4.12 0.181 0.0004 
Source. Computed from the survey data 
***, **, * Represent level of significance at 1%, 5% and 10 %, respectively 
 
Table 5. Marginal effects of Independent variables on rate of loan repayment in Lemo district, Hadiya zone. 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
Effect of change in 
independent Variable 
 on dependent Variable 
for observations at the 
lower limit 
 
 
Effect of change in 
independent Variable  
on dependent Variable 
 for observations at the 
Upper limit 
 
Effect of change in 
independent variable 
on dependent 
variable for non-
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FAM_SIZE -0.0146 -0.0104 -0.0144 -0.0118 
GENDER -0.0694 -0.0490 -0.0681 -0.0558 
AGE 0.0068 0.0048 0.0066 0.0051 
EDUCTLVL 0.0019 0.0014 0.0019 0.0015 
RODDIST -0.0014 -0.0010 -0.0013 -0.0011 
LANDHOLD 0.0780 0.0551 0.0765 0.0619 
LIVSTKNO 0.0158 0.0111 0.0155 0.0125 
PKGEXPRC 0.0469 0.0331 0.0460 0.0372 
DACONTCT 0.0220 0.0156 0.0216 0.0171 
BROWPURP 0.0648 0.0457 0.0635 0.0514 
CRDTSRCE 0.0764 0.0539 0.0749 0.0606 
LNAMNT   -8.0182 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
SAVING  0.0014 0.0010 0.0013 0.0011 
PURPOSE    4.0424 2.8543 3.9623 3.2126 
OFF_FARM 0.1337 0.0944 0.1310 0.1061 
CRMEXPNS    3.1632 2.2331 3.1002 2.5131 
Source: Owen computed data   
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS.  
Delivering productive credit to the rural poor has been a hotly pursued but problem-plagued undertaking. No other 
concern than loan default has an acute effect on the success of credit programs in rural areas. Loan default is a 
crucial problem of rural financial services. Therefore, the major concern of this study was to identify the major 
socio-economic, institutional and natural factors that affect loan repayment capacity of smallholder farmers in 
Lemo district of Hadiya zone, Southern Ethiopia. Two-limit Tobit model was employed to analyze factors 
influencing loan repayment and intensity of loan recovery among smallholder farmers in the zone.  A total of 
fifteen explanatory variables were included in the model of which five variables were found to be significant. 
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These were size of land holding, total number of livestock, number of years of experience in agricultural extension 
services, number of extension contact days, and income from off-farm activities.  Therefore, consideration of these 
factors is vital as it provides information that would enable to undertake effective measures with the aim of 
improving loan repayment in the lemo district. It would also enable lenders and policy makers to have information 
as to where and how to channel efforts in order to minimize loan default.    
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